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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant David Williams ("Williams") appeals the District 
Court's enhancement of his sentence in light of the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). W e have jurisdiction 
over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. For the following 
reasons, we affirm the District Court's sentence. 
 
I. 
 
On October 7, 1998, a grand jury for the District of New 
Jersey issued a fourteen-count indictment, in which 
Williams was charged with five counts of conspiracy to 
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.S 841(a)(1), 21 
U.S.C. S 846, and 18 U.S.C. S 2. An arr est warrant was 
issued for Williams on October 8, 1998 at his last known 
address, 36 Hawthorne Place, Apartment 2I, Montclair, New 
Jersey (the "Hawthorne Place apartment"). Williams' son, 
Charod Jermaine Williams, was at the apartment when the 
FBI agents and local police officers arrived, and he 
consented to a search of the apartment. The search of the 
Hawthorne Place apartment revealed, inter alia, 293.4 
grams of heroin and 311.2 grams of cocaine. 
 
Williams entered into a plea agr eement with the 
Government on Count Seven of the Indictment. The terms 
of the plea agreement are set forth in the Government's 
letter of January 29, 1999. The plea agreement states that 
"[t]he sentencing judge may impose the maximum term of 
imprisonment and the maximum fine that are consistent 
with the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, up to and including the statutory maximum 
term of imprisonment and the statutory maximumfine." 
The plea agreement further specifies that"[t]he violation of 
21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) charged in Count Seven of the 
Indictment . . . carries a statutory maximum penalty of 20 
years' imprisonment and a $1,000,000 fine." 
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The plea agreement also asserts that, "[i]f David Williams 
enters a guilty plea and is sentenced on this char ge, the 
United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey will 
not initiate any further charges against David Williams 
relating to the specific criminal conduct to which David 
Williams has agreed to plead guilty pursuant to this letter, 
nor will the United States Attorney for the District of New 
Jersey initiate any charges against David W illiams relating 
to the 8 October 1998 seizure of contraband fr om 36 
Hawthorne Place, Apartment 2I, Montclair , New Jersey." 
 
In connection with the plea agreement, W illiams and the 
Government stipulated that the amount of her oin involved 
in his violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) was approximately 
67.2 grams, making the base offense level for his violation 
22. In addition, the parties stipulated to a downwar d 
departure of 3 points for acceptance of personal 
responsibility, for a total offense level of 19. 
 
On March 3, 1999, a plea hearing was held befor e the 
District Court. At the plea hearing, Williams answered in 
the affirmative when asked by the District Court, "Do you 
understand that you could receive up to 20 years in prison 
and a fine of $1 million or both?" and when asked whether 
he understood that "this Court has the authority to impose 
sentence more severe than the statutory maximum or less 
severe than that provided by the guidelines." (Da-27-28.) At 
the hearing, Williams' plea of guilty to Count Seven of the 
Indictment was accepted. 
 
Also on March 3, 1999, Williams filled out an Application 
for Permission to Enter a Plea of Guilty, which stated, "[m]y 
lawyer has informed me, and I understand, that the 
maximum punishment which the law provides for the 
offense(s) charged in this Complaint/Indictment/ 
Information is: A MAXIMUM OF 20 years imprisonment and 
a fine of $1,000,000 for the offense(s) char ged in Count(s) 
7." (Govt. Ap. 18.) 
 
The Presentence Report ("PSR"), pr epared on April 5, 
1999 and revised on May 4, 1999, recommended that 361 
grams of heroin and 311.2 grams of cocaine be applicable 
to Williams for sentencing purposes. The drug quantity was 
apparently based on sales of heroin in which Williams was 
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involved totaling 67.2 grams, plus the 293.4 grams of 
heroin and 311.2 grams of cocaine found in the Hawthorne 
Place apartment. The PSR calculated Williams' base offense 
level at 28, converting the amounts of heroin and cocaine 
into the equivalent total amount of marijuana and applying 
the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c). The PSR 
then subtracted 3 points for acceptance of r esponsibility, 
leaving Williams' total offense level at 25. The PSR assigned 
Williams a total of 6 criminal history points, placing him in 
Criminal History Category III. 
 
The PSR specified that "[t]he maximum ter m of 
imprisonment is 20 years. 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(C)." The 
PSR stated that the guideline range for a total of fense level 
of 25 and a criminal history category of III was 70 to 87 
months. 
 
A sentencing hearing was held on May 24, 1999. At the 
hearing, the issue was raised of whether the drugs seized 
from the Hawthorne Place apartment should be included in 
the calculation of Williams' offense level. The District Court 
found: "It is clear from the submission of Probation and the 
FBI reports, and of course the Defendant doesn't contest 
that that's what the FBI would testify if they wer e called,1 
that the larger amount, the amount in the apartment, 
should be attributed to the Defendant. Therefor e, I will 
adopt the presentence report." (Da-50.) The District Court 
adopted the PSR's assignment to Williams of a total offense 
level of 25 and criminal history category III, for which the 
sentencing range is 70 to 87 months, and observed that 
criminal history category III "clearly understates his true 
criminal history." (Da-52.) The District Court then 
sentenced Williams to 85 months incar ceration. (Govt. Ap. 
25.) 
 
The District Court entered final judgment in this matter 
on June 2, 1999, and Williams filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal on June 3, 1999. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Defense counsel indicated at the hearing that Williams did not doubt 
the FBI agents' testimony, but challenged the veracity of what Charod 
Williams had told the agents. (Da-44.) 
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II. 
 
On appeal, we must determine whether the Supr eme 
Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey has an effect on 
the District Court's sentencing of Williams, to the extent 
that his sentence was altered by the District Court's finding 
that the drugs found in the Hawthorne Place apartment 
should be attributed to Williams for sentencing purposes. 
 
There are two issues that we must look at in deciding 
whether to apply Apprendi to this case: 1) whether the 
Supreme Court intended Apprendi to apply to cases in 
which the trial judge decides a fact that incr eases a 
defendant's sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, but 
the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory  
maximum;2 and 2) whether the Supr eme Court intended 
Apprendi to apply to cases in which judicial fact finding 
increases the possible sentence to be r eceived above the 
statutory maximum, but the actual sentence is below the 
statutory maximum. We exercise plenary r eview over the 
District Court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines 
and the possible constitutional implication of W illiams' 
sentence under Apprendi. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984); United States v. Thomas, 
221 F.3d 430, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
In Apprendi, the defendant had pleaded guilty, pursuant 
to a plea agreement, to two counts of second-degree 
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one 
count of third-degree unlawful possession of an 
antipersonnel bomb. Under New Jersey law, the second 
degree offenses carried a penalty range of 5 to 10 years and 
the third-degree offense carried a penalty of 3 to 5 years. 
 
Under the plea agreement, the State reserved the right to 
request an enhanced sentence of 10 to 20 years for one of 
the second-degree counts on the ground that the offense 
was committed with a biased purpose, because that of fense 
was based on an incident in which the defendant hadfired 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Williams raises the issue on appeal as to whether Apprendi "precludes 
enhancement of a guidelines sentence by consideration of an additional 
amount of narcotics not charged in the indictment on a standard of 
proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt." (Appellant's Brief, at 5.) 
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several shots into the home of an African-American family 
that had recently moved to a previously all-white 
neighborhood. The defendant reserved the right in the plea 
agreement to challenge any such hate crime sentence 
enhancement as violating the United States Constitution. 
 
The New Jersey trial court found that the hate crime 
enhancement did apply and sentenced the defendant to 12 
years on that count, two years more than the maximum 
sentence for second-degree offenses without the 
enhancement, and the trial court sentenced the defendant 
to two shorter sentences on the other two counts to run 
concurrently with the 12-year sentence. The Supreme 
Court vacated as unconstitutional the sentence imposed by 
the trial court, which had been affirmed by the New Jersey 
Superior Court, Appellate Division and by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court. The Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact 
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a r easonable 
doubt." 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. 
 
In this case, Williams was charged under 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1), which does not specify the applicable penalties. 
However, S 841(b)(1) sets forth penalties dependent on the 
amount of drugs involved. Section 841(b)(1)(A) pr ovides for 
imprisonment of 10 years to life if "1 kilogram or more of a 
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 
heroin" is involved. Under S 841(b)(1)(B), a person may be 
sentenced to 5 to 40 years imprisonment for a violation 
involving "100 grams or more of a mixtur e or substance 
containing a detectable amount of heroin." Finally, 
S 841(b)(1)(C) states that, "[i]n the case of a controlled 
substance in schedule I [which includes her oin] . . ., except 
as provided in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (D), such person 
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more 
than 20 years." 
 
Under the plea agreement, Williams stipulated to 67.2 
grams of heroin being involved in Count Seven and/or his 
relevant conduct alleged in Counts Five, Eight, and Nine of 
the Indictment, for which the applicable statutory 
maximum sentence is 20 years, under 21 U.S.C. 
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S 841(b)(1)(C).3 The base offense level for between 60 and 80 
grams of heroin under the Sentencing Guidelines is 22, and 
the plea agreement recommended a 3-point r eduction in 
offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Williams was 
placed in criminal history category III by the PSR and by 
the District Court. With a total offense level of 19 and 
criminal history category III, his sentence range under the 
Sentencing Guidelines was 37 to 46 months. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court found that 
the amount of drugs involved in Williams' of fense was 361 
grams of heroin and 311.2 grams of cocaine, on the 
recommendation in the PSR that the drugs found at 
Hawthorne Place apartment should be attributed to 
Williams. This increased Williams' base offense level to 28. 
At a total offense level of 25 (28 minus 3 points for 
acceptance of responsibility) and a criminal history category 
of III, the sentencing range for Williams was 70 to 87 
months. The District Court sentenced Williams to 85 
months. 
 
A. 
 
Initially, we hold that Apprendi does not apply to the 
increase in Williams' sentence under the Sentencing 
Guidelines. Apprendi did not dir ectly address this issue, 
because it concerned a sentence under state law. With 
regard to the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court stated: "The 
Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court. We 
therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this 
Court has already held." 120 S.Ct. at 2366 n.21 (citing 
Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998)). 
 
In Edwards v. United States, the Supr eme Court heard a 
claim by several defendants that a district judge's 
sentences of them for violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 841 and 846 
involving cocaine and crack distribution wer e unlawful, 
insofar as they were based on crack, because the jury was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. That this statutory maximum was applied to W illiams is confirmed in 
the plea agreement, by the District Court at the plea hearing, in 
Williams' Application for Permission to Enter a Plea of Guilty, and in the 
PSR. 
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not presented with the issue of whether their conduct 
involved cocaine or crack and the Sentencing Guidelines 
imposed higher penalties for distribution of crack than for 
distribution of cocaine. 523 U.S. at 513. The Court upheld 
the District Court's sentences, stating "[t]he Sentencing 
Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to 
determine both the amount and the kind of`controlled 
substances' for which a defendant should be held 
accountable--and then to impose a sentence that varies 
depending upon amount and kind." Edwar ds, 523 U.S. at 
513-14 (emphasis in text). The Court noted that the 
outcome of the case may have been differ ent if the District 
Court's sentence had exceeded the maximum per mitted by 
statute. The Court explained: 
 
       Of course, petitioners' statutory and constitutional 
       claims would make a difference if it wer e possible to 
       argue, say, that the sentences imposed exceeded the 
       maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only 
       conspiracy. That is because a maximum sentence set 
       by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the 
       Guidelines. USSG S 5G1.1. But, as the Gover nment 
       points out, the sentences imposed here wer e within the 
       statutory limits applicable to a cocaine-only 
       conspiracy, given the quantities of that drug attributed 
       to each petitioner. 
 
Edwards, 523 U.S. at 515. 
 
The Court also stated in Apprendi that "nothing in this 
history [of requiring a jury determination of guilt for every 
element of the crime charged] suggests that it is 
impermissible for judges to exercise discretion--taking into 
consideration various factors relating both to offense and 
offender--in imposing judgment within the range prescribed 
by statute." 120 S.Ct. at 2358. Though the application of 
the Sentencing Guidelines by judges is not entir ely 
discretionary, see United States v. Mistr etta, 488 U.S. 461, 
491 (1989) (stating that "the Guidelines bind judges and 
courts in the exercise of their uncontested r esponsibility to 
pass sentence in criminal cases"), the Sentencing 
Guidelines are in effect a codification of judges' exercise of 
discretion in sentencing precisely in the manner described 
by the Court. As Chief Judge Becker stated in his 
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concurrence in United States v. Mack,"the Sentencing 
Guidelines are . . . a constitutional mechanism for 
channeling the discretion that a sentencing court would 
otherwise enjoy." 2000 WL 1456245, at 14 (3d Cir . Sept. 
29, 2000) (Becker, J., concurring). 
 
As in Edwards, the District Court'sfinding in this case 
increased Williams' sentence under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, but the sentence did not exceed the statutory 
maximum. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court's 
finding was a permissible exercise of discretion, to the 
extent that the finding altered Williams' sentence under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. This holding is bolster ed further by 
our observation in United States v. Ceper o that, "[b]ecause 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines in this case does 
not implicate a fact that would increase the penalty of a 
crime beyond the statutory maximum, the teachings of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), are not relevant her e." 224 F.3d 256, 
267 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
B. 
 
We must now turn to the issue of whether the fact that 
the District Court's finding increased the possible statutory 
maximum under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1) implicates Apprendi. 
In Apprendi, the Court was ambiguous as to whether its 
holding should apply in such a situation. The Court in 
Apprendi characterized the constitutional rule as: " `[I]t is 
unconstitutional for a legislature to r emove from the jury 
the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range 
of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is 
equally clear that such facts must be established by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Appr endi, 120 S.Ct. at 2363 
(quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (opinion of Stevens, J.)) 
(emphasis added). The Court also stated that " `any fact 
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum 
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a r easonable 
doubt.' " 120 S.Ct. at 2355 (quoting Jones , 526 U.S. at 243 
n.6) (emphasis added). By those formulations, it could be 
argued that the Apprendi rule does apply to Williams, 
because the District Court's finding increased the 
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"prescribed range of penalties" and the"maximum penalty" 
to which Williams was exposed, even though his actual 
penalty did not exceed 20 years. 
 
However, as discussed earlier, the Court stated in 
Apprendi: "We should be clear that nothing in this history 
suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise 
discretion--taking into consideration various factors 
relating both to offense and offender--in imposing a 
judgment within the range prescribed by statute." 120 S.Ct. 
at 2358. This statement suggests that a District Court's 
sentence that is under the statutory maximum cannot be 
constitutionally objectionable under Appr endi.4 
 
Despite the ambiguity in Apprendi, we hold that it does 
not apply to Williams' sentence for several r easons. First 
and foremost, though the District Court's finding regarding 
the amount of drugs substantially increased the possible 
statutory maximum sentence under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1), 
we hold that Apprendi is not applicable to Williams' 
sentence, because the sentence actually imposed (seven 
years and one month) was well under the original statutory 
maximum of 20 years. 
 
Second, this 20-year maximum sentence was confir med 
several times in the course of Williams' plea and sentence. 
The plea agreement specified that the "statutory maximum 
penalty" for Williams' violation was 20 years imprisonment. 
The District Court confirmed at the plea hearing that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In this Circuit, we have addressed Apprendi only tangentially, in 
Cepero, discussed above, and in Judge Becker's concurrence in United 
States v. Mack, 2000 WL 1456245 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 2000). Judge Becker 
set forth a two-step "Apprendi inquiry" in Mack: 
 
       A court must first determine the "pr escribed statutory maximum" 
       sentence for the crime of which the defendant was convicted and 
       assess whether the defendant's ultimate sentence exceeded it. If it 
       did, the court must consider the second-order Apprendi question: 
       whether the enhanced sentence was based on "the fact of a prior 
       conviction." If it was, then the sentence is constitutional. If it 
was 
       not, then the sentence is unconstitutional. 
 
2000 WL 1456245, at 9. Under the Apprendi  test as formulated by Judge 
Becker, therefore, Williams' challenge would fail because he could not get 
beyond step one. 
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Williams understood that he "could r eceive up to 20 years 
in prison." Williams' application to enter a guilty plea stated 
that he understood that the maximum punishment under 
law for his offense was 20 years in prison. Finally, the PSR 
stated that 20 years was the maximum sentence under 21 
U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(C). 
 
Third, based on the amount of drugs that the District 
Court found attributable to Williams, it would not be 
possible for the District Court to sentence W illiams to a 
sentence exceeding 20 years under the Sentencing 
Guidelines. Even with an offense level of 28 (Williams' 
offense level with the drugs found by the District Court and 
without the 3-point downward adjustment) and criminal 
history category VI (the highest), the maximum sentence for 
Williams' offense under the Guidelines would be 175 
months, or 14 years and 7 months. Therefor e, the District 
Court's finding did not actually "expose" W illiams to a 
sentence above 20 years, as long as the District Court 
sentenced Williams within the range pr ovided in the 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
Fourth, the District Court's finding that the drugs in the 
Hawthorne Place apartment were attributable to Williams 
for sentencing purposes could be characterized as afinding 
of "relevant conduct" under the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Under U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(2), acts "that were part of the 
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the 
offense of conviction" may be consider ed as "relevant 
conduct" in calculating a defendant's base of fense level. As 
the Supreme Court stated in Edwards , "whether the judge 
believed that [the presence of the drugs in the Hawthorne 
Place apartment] was part of the `offense of conviction,' or 
the judge believed that it was [relevant conduct, t]he 
Guidelines sentencing range . . . is identical." 523 U.S. at 
514-15. Therefore, if the District Court found that the 
drugs in the Hawthorne Place apartment wer e attributable 
to Williams as relevant conduct, thefinding would affect 
the sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines but 
would not affect the range under the statute. 
 
Finally, at the sentencing hearing, the District Court 
expressed dissatisfaction with the low criminal history 
category assigned to Williams and indicated that the court 
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had discretion to depart upwards under U.S.S.G. S 4A1.3.5 
Indeed, the PSR lists ten convictions between 1958 and 
1970 for which no criminal history points wer e assigned. In 
addition, several of Williams' prior convictions resulted in 
substantial sentences of incarceration, including a sentence 
of 12 years in prison in 1986 for possession with intent to 
distribute heroin (and tax evasion). 
 
In reviewing Williams' criminal history and considering 
an upward departure, the District Court stated: 
 
       I do not feel that it is necessary to consider the 
       [upward] departure, although ther e are very, very good 
       grounds for that because his criminal history category 
       does not adequately predict his true criminal history of 
       likelihood of repeat offense. 
 
        So, if we didn't have that range [of 70 to 87 months], 
       I would have to consider [an upward departur e]. . . . 
 
        So we have a lengthy criminal history her e for a 
       number of very serious offenses. As I say, he would be 
       a career offender by departure because there certainly 
       is a very strong likelihood of repeat of fense and the 
       criminal history category of three clearly understates 
       his true criminal history but I decline to r each that at 
       this time because, looking at the offense level of 25 and 
       criminal history category of three, I find that the 70 to 
       87 month range is sufficient to protect the public at 
       this time. If I were wrong as to the of fense level, or 
       criminal history category, and it were lesser , I would 
       certainly consider the upward departure for adequacy 
       of criminal history. 
 
(Da-50, Da-52.) 
 
In stating that an upward departure might be appropriate 
but that the range of 70 to 87 months was sufficient, the 
District Court suggested that Williams' criminal history 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 4A1.3 allows the District Court to consider departing from the 
applicable Guideline range "[i]f reliable information indicates that the 
criminal history category does not adequately r eflect the seriousness of 
the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the 
defendant will commit other crimes." 
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contributed to the sentence of 85 months. The fact that an 
upward departure from a lower sentence range would likely 
be within the District Court's discretion based on Williams' 
lengthy criminal history lends further support to our 
decision not to vacate the sentence on Appr endi grounds. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affir m the District Court's 
sentence. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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